Remuneration report 2019
Introduction by the Chair of the Remuneration Committee
In 2019, DSM put forward a revised remuneration policy Managing Board and Supervisory Board Koninklijke DSM N.V. to the Annual General Meeting (AGM). We highly appreciated the dialogue with a number of our shareholders and representatives of institutional investors and the virtually unanimous support of the AGM (over 97% votes in favor). This first Remuneration report is in line with adjusted legislation and EU-guidelines based on the EU Shareholders' Rights Directive, and explains the application of the respective policies in 2019.
DSM is recognized as a purpose-led company, creating long-term value for all its stakeholders and society at large across the three dimensions of People, Planet and Profit. Our scientific expertise and innovation capabilities help us to find answers to some of the world's biggest challenges and to grow our business at the same time. The deployment of our Strategy 2021: Growth & value – Purpose led, Performance driven is supported by our remuneration policy. The design of our short and long-term incentive plans emphasizes long-term growth opportunities in the domains of Health, Nutrition and Sustainable Living. Targets on energy efficiency and greenhouse gas reduction, as well as a shift in portfolio toward Brighter Living Solutions, underpin our commitment to sustainability while ensuring financial performance in line with our key strategic goals (Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted net operating free cash flow). Obviously, our remuneration policy is designed to attract and retain the talent we require to achieve our Strategy 2021 and sustainable success in the long term.
In 2019, DSM continued to deliver improvements in customer-centricity, large innovation projects, as well as cost control and operational excellence, resulting in sound results and reflected in remuneration as presented in this report.
This Remuneration report provides a summary of the remuneration policy Managing Board Koninklijke DSM N.V. and the Supervisory Board Koninklijke DSM N.V. respectively as well as an overview of the remuneration of the members of the Managing Board and the Supervisory Board in the financial year 2019. The full, legally superseding remuneration policy as approved by the AGM is published on our website. This report is prepared in accordance with the relevant parts of Section 135 Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code.
Pauline van der Meer Mohr
Chair Remuneration Committee
Remuneration Managing Board Koninklijke DSM N.V. 2019
Summary remuneration policy Managing Board Koninklijke DSM N.V.
The remuneration policy Managing Board Koninklijke DSM N.V. (as approved by the 2019 AGM; 97.48% in favor) is designed to engage qualified leaders driving our purpose, enabling DSM to engage our people and other stakeholders and ultimately to achieve results – by putting customers first and by delivering on our promises. The policy provides a clear focus to improve company performance and to enhance purpose-led long-term value creation across multiple dimensions (profit: economical/financial, planet: ecological/sustainability and people: including societal) while acknowledging the societal context and recognizing the interests of all our stakeholders (especially our customers, employees, shareholders, as well as society at large).
The remuneration is linked to company and individual performance. Based on the short and long-term strategic objectives as well as our business drivers, results are measured on the basis of specified targets, balancing short- and long-term outcomes, serving the interests of all our stakeholders. In order to be competitive and to ensure alignment internally, Total Direct Remuneration offered by DSM approaches the median — from below — of a predefined peer group. Reward levels are benchmarked to the Dutch/European (no US companies) labor market peer group, while plan design of various reward components is reviewed against (the broader perspective of) best market practices.
Labor market peer group
European industry peers: | Dutch — AEX listed peers: | |
Clariant | Ahold Delhaize | |
Covestro | AkzoNobel | |
Evonik Industries | ASML | |
Givaudan | Heineken | |
Johnson Matthey | KPN | |
LANXESS | Philips | |
Lonza | Randstad | |
Solvay | Wolters Kluwer |
The full version of the remuneration policy Managing Board Koninklijke DSM N.V., as approved by the 2019 AGM, is available on the company website. The following table specifies the elements of the remuneration policy describing purpose, design and link to our company strategy as well as their (potential) value.
PURPOSE | DESIGN AND LINK TO STRATEGY | VALUE |
---|---|---|
Goal | ||
Total Direct Compensation | Includes base salary and variable income. Variable income concerns the performance-related Short-Term Incentive (STI) and the STI deferral & matching plan, as well as the Long-Term Incentive plan (LTI). In addition, Managing Board members are entitled to certain benefits. | Value of each respective item is included hereafter. |
Base salary | Aims to provide a fair and competitive basis for the total pay level to attract and retain qualified leaders. Annual review based on the market movement for executives based in the Netherlands and peer companies. In depth benchmark every three years. | Base salaries at DSM approach the median — from below — of the labor market peer group. |
Short-Term Incentive (STI) | The Supervisory Board sets goals and targets for the respective performance year and determines the extent to which they have been achieved. By ensuring that strategic objectives are properly reflected in stretched yet achievable targets, the realization of strategic business objectives is addressed. Half of the at-target STI is linked to financial objectives; the other half is tied to sustainability aspirations and individual goals. | On-target performance: 50% of annual base salary. Maximum opportunity capped at 100%. Threshold: no STI pay-out in case the target on Adjusted EBITDA is not achieved for at least 75%. |
STI deferral & matching | Conversion of STI into shares, with a 1:1 company match delivered in Performance Share Units (PSUs). The PSUs vest upon the realization of predefined goals (same as LTI program), observing a three-year vesting period. By linking the vesting of the PSUs to the targets of the LTI program, it is ensured that decisions regarding short-term results are aligned with long-term value creation. | Mandatory conversion: 25% of STI achieved; voluntary conversion: 0–25%, with incremental steps of 5%. Maximum number of matching PSUs to vest, equal to number granted. |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) | PSUs are awarded every year, to be converted into shares upon realization of predefined targets, observing a three-year vesting period. A five-year holding period (starting at grant date) applies. Performance goals are based on company strategy, driving long-term value creation. Half of the target LTI is linked to financial goals; the other half is linked to sustainability aspirations. Performance is measured over three financial years, starting with the year of grant. | The at-target grant equals 100% of base salary. Maximum vesting opportunity is 150% of the number of PSUs granted.1 |
Shareholding requirement | Managing Board members are expected to build up a shareholding in the company; the minimum shareholding requirement must be accrued in four years. Considered are shares privately purchased and vested shares granted under DSM share-based compensation plans. | The minimum share-holding requirement is 300% of annual base salary for the CEO and 200% for other MB-members. |
Pension and other benefits | Mandatory enrollment in basic pension plan as applicable to all DSM employees in the Netherlands (Collective Defined Contribution). In addition, a company-paid contribution to allow participation in the so-called Net Pension Plan under conditions as applicable to Netherlands-based employees (Individual Defined Contribution). Other benefits include sick pay (aligned with Netherlands-based employees) and a company car. | Pension scheme aligned with plans in place for employees in the Netherlands. Other benefits aligned with market practice. |
Goal setting | Supervisory Board sets goals, their respective weight and targets (i.e., metric) for the respective performance year under the STI and LTI scheme, considering:
At target level, there is a 50:50 split between financial goals and sustainability/individual goals. | Goals must be stretching yet achievable. |
Total remuneration Managing Board 2019
Actual remuneration 2019 is fully aligned with the remuneration policy which complies with EU requirements and Dutch legislation. Mr. Sijbesma's term as CEO and Chairman of the Managing Board / Executive Committee Koninklijke DSM N.V. and as member of the Managing Board, i.e., as Managing Director under the Articles of Association of the Company, expired as of 15 February 2020. In view of a proper handover to his successors and to finish certain projects, Mr. Sijbesma remains employed until 1 May 2020, observing the terms and conditions of the employment agreement. The terms and conditions of Mr. Sijbesma's leaving as part of a planned succession process are in line with DSM policies and practices. Mr. Sijbesma will not receive any severance payment and/or transitional compensation. Details reported here for Mr. Sijbesma concern the full calendar year 2019.
Base salary
Considering the general increase or market movement for DSM executives in the Netherlands and adjustments made by peer-group companies, base salaries have been adjusted; on average the adjustment amounts to 2.2% (CEO 1.9% and other members of the Managing Board 2.4%).
Fixed annual base salary
in € | 1 July 2019 | 1 July 2018 |
| ||
Feike Sijbesma | 960,000 | 942,500 |
Geraldine Matchett | 637,500 | 622,500 |
Dimitri de Vreeze | 637,500 | 622,500 |
As of 15 February 2020, the annual base salary of Geraldine Matchett and Dimitri de Vreeze amounts to €925,000 in view of their appointment as Co-CEO as per the same date.
Short-Term Incentive (STI)
This report includes the STI achievement 2019, payable in March 2020. Targets were set ahead of the STI cycle, in accordance with the remuneration policy and budgeted results for the current year, ensuring that achievement of threshold, target or maximum payout are challenging. A scenario analysis was conducted prior to final approval of the targets by the Supervisory Board.
Definitions goals set for 2019 STI (total 50% weight)
|
The company does not disclose the exact actual targets, as these qualify as commercially sensitive information, though the targets set are fully in line with the published strategic, financial and sustainability goals of the company. The overall average achievement of the Managing Board members for performance year 2019 amounts to 54% (2018: 80%) of annual base salary. The realization of the financial targets has been assessed by KPMG. In addition, KPMG assessed the validation process for non-financial targets.
In view of transparency, we categorize our target realization as follows: zero pay-out, below target, at target, above target or maximum pay-out. In 2019, the target achievement of the Adjusted EBITDA performance was below target. The achievement on Adjusted net operating free cash flow was above target. The target regarding Net sales growth was not achieved (zero pay-out). The many efforts to improve our Safety performance resulted in an above-target realization. Although the overall engagement score over 2019 was comparable to 2018, the target realization dropped to at target level, since the target was raised. Performance regarding portfolio management measured by Brighter Living Solutions, remained at target.
The combined realization resulted in a 2019 STI pay-out as included in the overview below.
Short-Term Incentive
in € | 2019 | 2018 |
Feike Sijbesma | 541,261 | 756,641 |
Geraldine Matchett | 326,970 | 498,672 |
Dimitri de Vreeze | 342,720 | 483,328 |
Short-Term Incentive deferral & matching (STI)
In addition to the mandatory deferral (25% of STI achieved), the Managing Board members decided to convert an additional 25% (maximum possible) of the STI achieved in 2019 into shares. This means that all Managing Board members converted 50% of their STI (100% of the cash after tax) into this long-term incentive, representing their trust and focus on the long term. A 1:1 grant of PSUs was implemented, amounting to 8,898 PSUs in total (2018: 9,864), the following table provides an overview. For more information see the section on 'Equity based compensation' in this Remuneration report.
Grant of PSUs under the short-term deferral & matching scheme
Number of PSUs granted | 2019 grant (vesting 2022) | 2018 grant (vesting 2021) |
Feike Sijbesma | 3,872 | 4,264 |
Geraldine Matchett | 2,552 | 2,800 |
Dimitri de Vreeze | 2,474 | 2,800 |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI)
2019 and 2020 grant
In 2019, 18,500 Performance Shares Units (PSUs) (2018: 17,000) were granted to the CEO. The 2019 grant to the other Managing Board members amounted to 12,500 PSUs (2018: 11,000).
The 2020 grant equals 12,500 PSUs for each Co-CEO, Geraldine Matchett and Dimitri de Vreeze. Feike Sijbesma is not eligible for a grant in 2020. Any grant equals the maximum number of PSUs that may vest.
Goal setting and vesting scheme
Targets were set ahead of the LTI cycle, in accordance with the remuneration policy, ensuring that achievement of threshold, target or maximum vesting are challenging. A scenario analysis was conducted.
Definition goals set for LTI grants
|
Vesting 2016 grant
The performance period of the PSUs granted in 2016 was completed by year-end 2018: the actual vesting was on 31 March 2019. This concerns the PSUs granted under the Long-Term Incentive plan as well as the PSUs granted under the STI deferral & matching plan. Since all targets were achieved at maximum, all PSUs granted also vested (maximum vesting). The following vesting schemes applied (given its business-sensitive nature, the ROCE-vesting scheme is not disclosed).
TSR vesting scheme1 | EEI vesting scheme | GHGE Efficiency improvement vesting scheme 2 | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Rank | % of PSUs | DSM EEI% | % of PSUs | DSM GHGE | % of PSUs |
1 | 100 | ≥ 4.00 | 100 | ≥ 8.25 | 100 |
2 | 97 | 3.25 - < 4.00 | 83 | 7.75 - < 8.25 | 83 |
3 | 93 | 2.75 - < 3.25 | 67 | 7.25 - < 7.75 | 67 |
4 | 87 | 2.50 - < 2.75 | 50 | 6.75 - < 7.25 | 50 |
5 | 80 | 2.25 - < 2.50 | 33 | 6.25 - < 6.75 | 33 |
6 | 73 | 2.00 - < 2.25 | 17 | 5.75 - < 6.25 | 17 |
7 | 67 | < 2.00 | 0 | < 5.75 | 0 |
8 | 50 | ||||
9 | 33 | ||||
10-15 | 0 |
The table provides an overview of the number of PSUs granted in 2016 that vested (i.e., converted to unconditional shares) in 2019.
PSUs granted in 2016 vested in 2019
Number of PSUs vested1 | LTI | STI deferral & matching scheme |
Feike Sijbesma | 31,000 | 5,350 |
Geraldine Matchett | 20,500 | 3,506 |
Dimitri de Vreeze | 20,500 | 3,505 |
Pension and other benefits
Participation in the basic pension plan provided by the Dutch pension fund (Stichting Pensioenfonds DSM Nederland — PDN) to all DSM employees in the Netherlands is mandatory for the Managing Board. Regarding pensionable salary not covered by the basic pension plan, a company-paid pension contribution as determined by the Supervisory Board applies. This contribution can be used by Managing Board members to participate in the so-called Net Pension Plan under conditions as applicable to all participating DSM employees.
The company provides an accident insurance, a company car and a fixed representation allowance in line with market practice.
Total remuneration
Actual remuneration 2019 is fully aligned with the remuneration policy. The latest benchmark conducted, demonstrated that DSM lags the median of the labor market peer group, also considering the pay-out scenarios of the incentive schemes. For the CEO, the total remuneration is in the lowest quartile of our own — Dutch/European — benchmark. For the other Managing Board members, it is in the second quartile but below the median. The difference would become even bigger if the benchmark comparison were made with a global peer group (i.e., including US-based peers).
The table provides an overview of the total remuneration expense for the Managing Board (the cost reported for DSM, are not in all cases the compensation paid nor the cash outflows for DSM).
DSM's remuneration expense for the Managing Board (the costs reported here for DSM, according to IFRS definitions, are not in all cases the compensation paid, nor the cash outflows for DSM)
x € thousand | Fixed | Variable compensation | Fixed | Fixed | Total | Proportion fixed / variable compensation | ||||||||
Base Salary / Fees | Short-Term Incentive | Share-based Compensation1 | Pension expenditure2 | Other items3 | ||||||||||
2019 | 2018 | 2019 | 2018 | 20194 | 20184 | 2019 | 2018 | 2019 | 2018 | 2019 | 2018 | 2019 | 2018 | |
Feike Sijbesma, CEO | 951 | 931 | 541 | 757 | 1,563 | 1,415 | 234 | 218 | 59 | 58 | 3,348 | 3,379 | 37:63 | 36:64 |
Geraldine Matchett, CFO | 630 | 614 | 327 | 499 | 1,030 | 933 | 109 | 107 | 86 | 116 | 2,182 | 2,269 | 38:62 | 37:63 |
Dimitri de Vreeze, member | 630 | 614 | 343 | 483 | 1,029 | 922 | 126 | 123 | 47 | 46 | 2,175 | 2,188 | 37:63 | 36:64 |
Total Managing Board | 2,211 | 2,159 | 1,211 | 1,739 | 3,622 | 3,270 | 469 | 448 | 192 | 220 | 7,705 | 7,836 | 37:63 | 36:64 |
Equity-based compensation
Overview of outstanding equity compensation
The table below provides an overview of outstanding PSUs (granted under the LTI and STI deferral & matching scheme respectively). The main conditions of the share-based compensation are:
Vehicle | Performance Share Units (PSUs), converted to shares at vesting |
Grant date | Last trading day in March |
Vesting period | Three years, starting at grant date |
Vesting conditions | - Realization of predefined performance goals |
Performance period | Three performance years, starting 1 January of the year of grant |
Holding period | Five years, starting at grant date |
Lock-up period | Blocking period chosen by incumbent, may result in tax discount |
Outstanding Performance Share Units
Year of issue | Outstanding at 31 Dec. 2018 | In 2019 | Outstanding at | Share price at date of grant (€) | |||
Granted | Vested | Forfeited / expired | |||||
Feike Sijbesma | 2016 | 36,350 | - | (36,350) | - | - | 48.79 |
2017 | 29,333 | - | - | - | 29,333 | 63.65 | |
2018 | 21,264 | - | - | - | 21,264 | 80.04 | |
2019 | - | 22,372 | - | - | 22,372 | 97.74 | |
Total | 86,947 | 22,372 | (36,350) | - | 72,969 | ||
Retained shares originated from PSUs | 116,402 | ||||||
Geraldine Matchett | 2016 | 24,006 | - | (24,006) | - | - | 48.79 |
2017 | 19,092 | - | - | - | 19,092 | 63.65 | |
2018 | 13,800 | - | - | - | 13,800 | 80.04 | |
2019 | - | 15,052 | - | - | 15,052 | 97.74 | |
Total | 56,898 | 15,052 | (24,006) | - | 47,944 | ||
Retained shares originated from PSUs | 33,631 | ||||||
Dimitri de Vreeze | 2016 | 24,005 | - | (24,005) | - | - | 48.79 |
2017 | 19,092 | - | - | - | 19,092 | 63.65 | |
2018 | 13,800 | - | - | - | 13,800 | 80.04 | |
2019 | - | 14,974 | - | - | 14,974 | 97.74 | |
Total | 56,897 | 14,974 | (24,005) | - | 47,866 | ||
Retained shares originated from PSUs | 27,587 |
The table below provides an overview of stock options held by members of the Managing Board. Mr. de Vreeze received these stock options prior to his first appointment as a Managing Board member. During 2019, he exercised 18,000 stock options; the shares were sold for an average share price of €94.44.
Outstanding stock options
Year of issue | Outstanding at 31 Dec. 2018 | In 2019 | Outstanding at 31 Dec. 20191 | Average share price at exercise (€) | Exercise | Expiry date | ||
Exercised | Forfeited/expired | |||||||
Dimitri de Vreeze | 2011 | 18,000 | (18,000) | - | - | 94.44 | 46.20 | 2 May 2019 |
2012 | 12,000 | - | - | 12,000 | 40.90 | 15 May 2020 | ||
2013 | 12,000 | - | - | 12,000 | 48.91 | 7 May 2021 | ||
Total | 42,000 | (18,000) | - | 24,000 | ||||
Of which vested | 42,000 | 24,000 |
For employee information, as required by section 383d Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code, reference is made to Note 27, 'Share-based compensation'. As at 31 December 2019, 3,020,830 (2018: 5,616,235) of the total number of treasury shares outstanding were held for servicing management, personnel share option rights and performance share unit plans.
Shareholding obligation
In addition to the performance shares held on the basis of vested grants under the DSM Stock Incentive Plan, all members of the Managing Board have invested in DSM shares, emphasizing their confidence in the company and its strategy. These shares were bought through private transactions with private funds (including shares purchased through STI deferral). The table provides an overview of the number of shares held at year-end.
Managing Board holdings of DSM shares
31 December 2019 | 31 December 2018 | |||||
Ordinary shares purchased with private money | Holdings from vested PSUs | Total | Ordinary shares purchased with private money | Holdings from vested PSUs | Total | |
Feike Sijbesma | 72,345 | 116,402 | 188,747 | 68,473 | 97,125 | 165,598 |
Geraldine Matchett | 13,328 | 33,631 | 46,959 | 10,776 | 17,638 | 28,414 |
Dimitri de Vreeze | 22,357 | 27,587 | 49,944 | 19,883 | 14,858 | 34,741 |
Total holdings | 108,030 | 177,620 | 285,650 | 99,132 | 129,621 | 228,753 |
All Managing Board members significantly exceed the shareholding obligation (300% of base salary for the CEO; 200% of base salary for other Managing Board members).
Company performance versus remuneration over time
Five-year review of company performance and Managing Board remuneration
The following table provides an overview of the development of the remuneration of the members of the Managing Board over the past five years, the development of company performance and the average remuneration of other employees (excluding the Managing Board members and discontinued operations). Total remuneration for Managing Board members are the remuneration expenses calculated in accordance with IFRS as included in the annual reports of the relevant years. The table provides an overview of company performance based on Adjusted EBITDA, share price (year average) and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
Typically, the share of total remuneration that is at risk varies for different employee segments and geographies, due to the impact of incentive schemes. Whereas the percentage of variable pay as a percentage of total remuneration is highest for the CEO/Managing Board (at target 150%), it may be limited or nil for other employee segments or in certain countries (also as a result of CLA negotiations). Based on performance, the results of the respective incentive schemes (and therefore the impact on total remuneration) varies over time. The average remuneration of all other employees (excluding the Managing Board) is not only influenced by factors such as differences in the pay mix (as mentioned above), or changes in exchange rates, but also factors related to the composition of the employee polulation such as the impact of acquisitions and divestments, restructuring, in- and outflow of personnel.
5-year Overview remuneration and company performance (unless mentioned otherwise, year-on-year change)
2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | Average1 | ||
Managing Board remuneration | |||||||
Feike Sijbesma | Base salary | 0.8% | 3.4% | 1.1% | 2.3% | 2.1% | 1.9% |
Total remuneration | 18.9% | 14.5% | -0.1% | 24.8% | -0.9% | 11.4% | |
Geraldine Matchett2 | Base salary | 3.5% | 1.4% | 2.7% | 2.6% | 2.6% | |
Total remuneration | 27.3% | 12.0% | 22.3% | -3.8% | 14.5% | ||
Dimitri de Vreeze3 | Base salary | 3.5% | 1.4% | 2.7% | 2.6% | 2.6% | |
Total remuneration | 15.5% | 3.9% | 25.1% | -0.6% | 11.0% | ||
Company performance | |||||||
Adjusted EBITDA underlying business4 | 3.6% | 17.4% | 14.5% | 6.0% | 9.9% | 10.3% | |
Year-average share price | -2.7% | 9.1% | 24.4% | 25.8% | 23.1% | 15.9% | |
GHGE Efficiency improvement in the respective year | 4.7% | 4.2% | 4.1% | 9.3% | 12.7% | 7.0% | |
Development of average employee remuneration | |||||||
Base salary employees Netherlands | 4.2% | 4.3% | 3.3% | 3.4% | 3.8% | ||
Average remuneration cost of employees (globally) | 6.8% | 4.2% | 0.9% | -1.6% | -0.2% | 2.0% |
DSM's performance in terms of (profit) growth, share price increase and greenhouse gas emissions reduction has been very good over the last five years, as shown in the above table. The Managing Board's total remuneration expenses (including the achievements on short and long-term incentive schemes as well as pension expenditures), developed in line with the improving performance of the company. The year-on-year change in base salary of the CEO and Managing Board members remains below the year-on-year change in the average base salary of the employees in the Netherlands. Average total remuneration cost of other employees (globally) concern all employee cost as included in Note 5 of the Consolidated Financial Statements. The flattening of the change in the last three years is to a large extent caused by M&A activities and restructuring of our operations, while the adjustments of exchange rates also had an impact. The year-on-year change of the average base salary in the Netherlands, as well as average employee cost globally, are influenced by the fact that the composition of the underlying employee population changes from year to year as a consequence of among others retirements, new hires, restructurings, and M&A activities.
Pay ratio
Under the Dutch Corporate Governance Code companies are required to publish a pay ratio. As the Code does not provide a definition of the pay ratio, the calculation method applied will vary per company, which will make the pay ratio data incomparable. The pay ratio per company will also differ year on year, since the variable pay (as a percentage of annual base salary) of the CEO/Managing Board is typically much higher (150% at target) than the variable pay of the comparable average employee group (limited or no variable pay component), and this variable pay will fluctuate with business results. On top of that, different regions of the world have different pay structures, so acquisitions/divestments, growth in certain areas and foreign exchange rates will equally influence the pay ratio. DSM complies with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code in providing a pay ratio, as measured per 31 December 2019.
The pay ratio calculated versus the Dutch employee remuneration average was 25:1 (2018: 26:1) (compared to CEO remuneration) or 19:1 (2018: 20:1) (compared to average Managing Board remuneration). This is based on total cost of €530 million in the Netherlands (which includes the remuneration of the Managing Board and has been deducted in the ratio calculation) and a headcount in the Netherlands of 3,960 as at 31 December 2019.
The ratio of total remuneration, including annual base salary, STI, LTI and other benefits such as pension (as reported in this Remuneration report) versus the average of total global employee (i.e., including Dutch) remuneration, is for the CEO 41:1 (2018: 40:1). The pay ratio of the average Managing Board total remuneration versus the average of total global employee remuneration is 32:1 (2018: 31:1). The increase is due to the higher number of shares that now vested (so a lower number of shares that were forfeited over the period 2016-2018) of the total number of shares that were granted in 2016, due to the good performance of the company.
However, if the pay ratio is calculated on the basis of the estimated vesting percentage, so without the additional non-cash vesting of shares for the series 2016–2018, the pay ratio compared to the Dutch employee average for the CEO would be 20:1 (2018: 22:1) and for the average of the Managing Board remuneration 15:1 (2018: 17:1). Compared to the total global employee remuneration, these would be 33:1 (2018: 34:1) for the CEO and 25:1 (2018: 26:1) for the average of the Managing Board.
Underlying data for the pay ratio calculation can be retrieved from the table 'DSM's remuneration expense for the Managing Board' (including table notes) in the section 'Total remuneration' of this Remuneration report, as well as from the table 'Geographical information' in Note 4, and Note 5, 'Net sales and costs'. Data for the Netherlands are explicitly mentioned as they are not directly retrievable.
Remuneration Supervisory Board Koninklijke DSM N.V. 2019
Summary of the remuneration policy Supervisory Board Koninklijke DSM N.V.
The remuneration policy is designed to engage qualified leaders with the right balance of personal skills, competences and experience required to oversee (the execution of) the company's strategy, its performance and long-term value creation, recognizing the interests of all stakeholders. In line with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, the remuneration is not linked to company and individual performance. As a reference, the remuneration of the Supervisory Board is benchmarked to market practice, predominantly against AEX companies, given the company's country of domicile. The total fixed remuneration should approach the median of the reference market. The full version of the remuneration policy Supervisory Board Koninklijke DSM N.V. as approved by the 2019 AGM is available on the company website.
The table below summarizes the key elements of the remuneration policy, describing purpose, design and (potential) value.
PURPOSE | DESIGN | VALUE |
---|---|---|
Fixed fee | Reward and incentivize Supervisory Board members to utilize their skills and competences to the maximum extent possible in executing their tasks. The reward reflects the nature of responsibilities and time spent. Aims to provide a fair and competitive pay level to engage qualified leaders. | Approaching the median of the market reference (predominantly AEX companies). |
Intercontinental travel fee | Fixed amount representing time commitment related to intercontinental travel. | €5,000 for each time it is required to travel outside the continent of residence. |
Expenses | Expenses incurred in fulfilling duties are reimbursed. To be paid upon submission of a statement of expenses, partially covered by a fixed allowance. | Depending on level of expenses. Fixed per annum: €1,250. |
Shareholding requirement | In line with Dutch Corporate Governance Code no mandatory shareholding requirement. Supervisory Board members are encouraged to invest in privately owned DSM shares. | Not applicable. |
Benefits and loans | Supervisory Board members are not entitled to participate in any benefits program offered to employees. Loans will not be provided. | Not applicable. |
Total remuneration 2019
Committee overview
The Supervisory Board members are assigned to the various committees.
Committee overview | Audit | Nomination | Remuneration | Sustainability |
Rob Routs (Chair) | Chair | Member | ||
Pauline van der Meer Mohr (Deputy Chair) | Member | Chair | ||
Victoria Haynes | Member | Member | ||
Eileen Kennedy | Member | Chair | ||
Erica Mann (as of 8 May 2019) | Member | Member | ||
Frits van Paasschen | Member | Member | ||
Pradeep Pant | Member | Member | ||
John Ramsay | Chair | Member |
Total Remuneration
The table provides an overview of total remuneration provided in 2019; as of 8 May 2019, the revised policy as approved by the 2019 AGM applies.
Remuneration Supervisory Board Members
in € | Fixed | Total remuneration | Proportion fixed/variable compensation | |||||||
Annual fee | Committee fee | Other costs1 | ||||||||
2019 | 2018 | 2019 | 2018 | 2019 | 2018 | 2019 | 2018 | 2019 | 2018 | |
Rob Routs, Chair | 96,667 | 85,000 | 20,208 | 17,000 | 6,250 | 5,250 | 123,125 | 107,250 | 100:0 | 100:0 |
Pauline van der Meer Mohr, Dep. Chair | 68,750 | 60,000 | 20,208 | 17,000 | 6,250 | 5,250 | 95,208 | 82,250 | 100:0 | 100:0 |
Tom de Swaan, Dep. Chair (until 9 May 2018) | - | 30,000 | - | 8,800 | - | 625 | - | 39,425 | - | 100:0 |
Victoria Haynes, Member | 65,833 | 60,000 | 19,042 | 17,000 | 24,250 | 17,250 | 109,125 | 94,250 | 100:0 | 100:0 |
Eileen Kennedy, Member | 65,833 | 60,000 | 20,209 | 17,000 | 24,250 | 13,250 | 110,292 | 90,250 | 100:0 | 100:0 |
Erica Mann, Member (as of 8 May 2019) | 40,833 | - | 11,958 | - | 14,730 | - | 67,521 | - | 100:0 | - |
Frits van Paasschen, Member | 65,833 | 60,000 | 19,042 | 17,000 | 29,250 | 25,250 | 114,125 | 102,250 | 100:0 | 100:0 |
Pradeep Pant, Member | 65,833 | 60,000 | 19,042 | 17,000 | 24,250 | 21,250 | 109,125 | 98,250 | 100:0 | 100:0 |
John Ramsay, Member | 65,833 | 60,000 | 24,917 | 17,200 | 6,250 | 5,250 | 97,000 | 82,450 | 100:0 | 100:0 |
Total | 535,415 | 475,000 | 154,626 | 128,000 | 135,480 | 93,375 | 825,521 | 696,375 | 100:0 | 100:0 |
In line with the remuneration policy, no variable compensation applies, and Supervisory Board members do not participate in any pension scheme. No extraordinary items apply. The total spent in 2019 was higher compared to 2018. This is based on an extension of the Supervisory Board in view of succession planning and the renewal of the remuneration policy that allows for an adjustment of the annual fixed fees by an average of 20% (note that the last adjustment of fees took place in 2016).
Benefits and loans
Members of the Supervisory Board are not eligible for any benefit programs offered by the company (or any beneficiary) to its employees, neither have any loans been provided.
Equity based compensation
As confirmed in the remuneration policy, Supervisory Board members do not receive any equity-based compensation. They are, however, encouraged to hold privately owned shares. At year-end 2019, Pauline van der Meer Mohr held 1,529 shares (2018: 1,529); Victoria Haynes held 300 shares (2018: 300) and John Ramsay held 1,057 shares (2018: 1,057). No other member of the Supervisory Board held shares in the company during 2019.
Remuneration over time
The table provides an overview of the total remuneration of the Supervisory Board members over a five-year period. A comparison of the development of total remuneration compared to company performance is not provided, as the Supervisory Board's total remuneration is not linked to company performance (Dutch Corporate Governance Code and remuneration policy Supervisory Board Koninklijke DSM N.V.).
5-year Remuneration overview Supervisory Board
2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 5-year average | |
Rob Routs - Chair | -3.5% | 15.5% | 10.9% | 0.0% | 14.8% | 7.5% |
Pauline van der Meer Mohr - Dep. Chair | -5.4% | 14.9% | 10.2% | 0.0% | 15.8% | 7.1% |
Victoria Haynes - Member | 3.9% | 10.5% | 7.6% | 0.0% | 15.8% | 7.6% |
Eileen Kennedy - Member | 4.2% | 26.5% | 0.4% | -4.2% | 22.2% | 9.8% |
Erica Mann - Member (as of 8 May 2019) | ||||||
Frits van Paasschen - Member (as of 3 May 2017) | 11.6% | |||||
Pradeep Pant - Member (as of 29 April 2016) | -3.9% | 11.1% | ||||
John Ramsay - Member (as of 3 May 2017) | 17.6% |
Closing remarks and shareholder vote
The company did not provide any loans to any member of the Supervisory or Managing Board. The company website contains an overview of the main terms and conditions of employment of both Co-CEOs.
The 2019 AGM approved the remuneration policy Supervisory Board Koninklijke DSM N.V. (98.45% in favor) as well as the remuneration policy Managing Board Koninklijke DSM N.V. (97.48% in favor). The total remuneration delivered in 2019 is aligned with the respective remuneration policies: no deviations or derogations applied. As in 2018, no revision or claw-back of any incentives occurred in 2019.
The remuneration for the financial year 2019, as described in this report, is subject to an advisory vote at the 2020 AGM. Questions raised in the 2019 AGM regarding remuneration items have been addressed in the respective meeting, reference is made to the minutes of the meeting, posted on the company website. As a result, there were no specifics raised that needed to be addressed in this Remuneration report.
Heerlen, 26 February 2020 |
The Supervisory Board |
---|
Rob Routs, Chair |
Pauline van der Meer Mohr, Deputy Chair |
Victoria Haynes |
Eileen Kennedy |
Erica Mann |
Frits van Paasschen |
Pradeep Pant |
John Ramsay |